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1 Introduction
In 1900, around 7% of the American workforce in the non-agricultural private sector were
union members. The percentage of union members in the private sector rose until the middle
of the century, as shown in Figure 1, reaching its apex at roughly 40%. It then began a
slow decline. At the end of century, only about 7% of American workers in the private
sector belonged to a union. Income inequality followed a diﬀerent path. At the beginning
of the 20th century, the top 10% of workers earned 41% of income. This measure of income
inequality first declined, hitting a low of 31% around mid-century. It then steadily increased
to 41% around 2000.1 What could have caused the ∩-shaped pattern of union membership
and the ∪-shaped one for income inequality? Are they related?
The hypothesis here is that skill-biased technological change underlies the rise and fall
in union membership, along with the up and down in income inequality. The beginning of
the 20th century witnessed a shift away from an artisan economy toward one transformed
by assembly line and mass production. This transformation favored unskilled labor. The
premium for skill declined.2 Unskilled labor is homogenous almost by definition, making it
easier to unionize than skilled labor. When the demand for unskilled labor rises there is a
larger payoﬀ to unionizing it. These trends started to shift at the midpoint of the century.
The second industrial revolution was petering out and the information age was dawning.
Transistors and silicon chips meant that automatons could replace the hoards of unskilled
workers laboring on factory and oﬃce floors. These developments represented a reversal of
the patterns observed earlier in the 20th century.
A general equilibrium model of unionization is developed. The union makes two inter-
1 The income inequality measure is before individual income taxes—see the data appendix for more detail.
Therefore changes in the progressivity of income taxation do not account for the ∪-shaped pattern in income
inequality. The rise in inequality since the 1970s is well documented and holds for a wide variety of inequality
measures—see Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993) for an early documentation of this trend for many measures
of wage inequality.
2 Interestingly, Goldin and Katz (2008, Figure 8.1, p. 290) report a ∪-shaped pattern for the college-
graduate wage premium for the period of study here. Somewhat surprisingly, they also show that during
the first part of the twentieth century the high-school graduate wage premium actually fell; i.e., the return
to a less-than-high-school education rose. These facts fit well into the framework laid out here.
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connected decisions. First, it picks a common wage rate for its members. Second, the union
selects which firms in the economy to organize. Unionization is a costly process. Firms sell
output in a competitive market. They hire both skilled and unskilled labor. These inputs
are substitutable to some extent. When the productivity of unskilled labor is high (relative
to skilled labor) the union can pick a high wage. It also pays to organize more firms. Firms
diﬀer in their productivity, so when organizing labor the union will select the most profitable
firms. Those firms that are not unionized can hire labor in a competitive market.
The modeling of unions builds upon the work of MacDonald and Robinson (1992), who
do not focus on the emergence and decline of unions. They present a model of the extent of
unionization in a competitive industry where all firms are the same. The key ingredients of
their model are: (i) unionization is a costly activity; (ii) unions must oﬀer their members a
wage net of dues that exceeds the competitive one; (iii) the union wage must allow organized
firms to make non-negative profits. MacDonald and Robinson (1992) model an industry in
partial equilibrium, and start oﬀ at the level of a firm’s cost function. Modeling skill-biased
technological change requires, instead, starting oﬀ from a firm’s production function that
can accommodate both skilled and unskilled labor. In addition, analyzing the implications
of this form of technological change for income distribution in the economy requires a general
equilibriummodel that embeds unions, as well as heterogeneous individuals and firms. These
elements are needed to address the question studied here: What caused the rise and fall of
unions in the U.S.?
The hypotheses proposed here is taken to the data in three ways. First, historical ev-
idence is presented regarding the evolution of unionization and skill-biased technological
change, with particular attention to the transformation of the U.S. economy over the 20th
century by, initially, mass production, and later, computerization. Second, the developed
model is calibrated and simulated to see whether or not it is capable of explaining the extent
of unionization and the level of income inequality that was observed over the course of the
20th century. It is. The required pattern of skill-biased technological progress is in line
with the qualitative picture painted by the historical evidence. Third, statistical analysis is
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undertaken to relate unionization to skill-biased technological change in a regression frame-
work where other potential factors that may have influenced unionization are controlled for.
Incorporating these other factors into the developed general equilibrium model is not de-
sirable, both for reasons of clarity and practicality. The statistical evidence suggests that
skill-biased technological change, the model’s exogenous driver, is statistically and econom-
ically important in explaining both the recent rise in the relative demand for skilled labor
in the U.S. and the decline of unionization. Additionally, it is shown that the analysis also
has relevance for deunionization in other OECD countries.
Acemoglu, Aghion and Violante (2002) also analyze how skill-biased technological change
can lead to deunionization. Their framework is very diﬀerent from the one developed here.
In particular, there are two sectors in the economy, one unionized, the other non-unionized.
Skilled workers only work in the non-unionized sector. Unskilled labor can work in either
sector. As the productivity of skilled workers relative to unskilled workers rises more people
choose to become skilled and hence are employed in the non-unionized part of the economy.
Their analysis is entirely theoretical in nature.
Acikgoz and Kaymak (2011) embed a model of unionization into a Mortensen-Pissarides
style job matching model. In their framework, workers diﬀer both by their ability and skill
levels. Firms observe both attributes, while unions see only the latter. They argue that a
rise in the skill premium, which rewards both ability and skill, reduces the incentive for a
skilled worker to join a union. The rise in the skill premium is also associated with unskilled
workers becoming less productive. This renders them less attractive for firms to hire at
high union wages. The current analysis stresses, by contrast, the interplay between firms
and unions. Unions organize the most profitable slice of the spectrum of firms. The size of
this slice depends on the state of the production technology in the economy and the cost of
union organizing. Furthermore, not only the fall, but also the rise, of unions is explained
here by technological change. Finally, in the empirical work, a direct measure of skill-biased
technological progress is used. The model’s mechanism is also explored for several OECD
countries, in addition to the U.S.
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2 Mass Production and Computerization
2.1 The Rise of Unions, 1913-1955
Mass production and Fordism were interchangeable terms at one time. In 1913 Ford’s
Highland Park plant became the first automobile factory to have a moving assembly line. It
signalled the death of the craft production methods that characterized the previous century.
This was achieved through the use of standardized parts, pioneered in the 19th century arms
industry. Time spent fitting inexact parts was eliminated. The moving assembly line was
also inspired by the flow production techniques used in flour milling and meat packing. It
reduced the unnecessary handling of the product associated with ferrying the work between
production operations—in early factories the placement of machines was often organized by
their intrinsic operations (say drilling or milling) and not by where they lay in the production
sequence. The result was a greater specialization of labor.
At the beginning of the 20th century, automotive, carriage and wagon, and machine
and metal-working workshops were artisanal in character. They had three types of workers:
skilled mechanics, specialists, and laborers. The skilled mechanics undertook the produc-
tive operations. They also supervised the other workers. A census report stated that the
“machinist, in its highest application, means a skilled worker who thoroughly understands
the use of metal-working machinery, as well as fitting and working at the bench with other
tools.” Laborers were unskilled and did “manual labor that requires little or no experience
or no judgement, such as shovelers, loaders, carriers, and general laborers.” The semi-skilled
specialist lay between these two categories. The census referred to them as “machinists, of
inferior skill.” It stated that “those who are able to run only a single machine or perhaps
do a little bench work, are classified as second class machinists and grouped with machine
tenders and machine hands.” Meyer (1981, pp 13-14) describes how Ford engines were put
together just before the assembly line was born:
At the assembly bench, the skilled worker occupied a central place. He began
with a bare motor block, utilized a wide range of mental and manual skills, and
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attached part after part. Not only did he assemble parts, but he also ‘fitted’
them. If two parts did not go together, he placed them in his vice and filed them
to fit. The work routines contained variations in tasks and required considerable
amounts of skill and judgment. Additionally, unskilled truckers served the skilled
assemblers. When an assembler completed his engine, a trucker carried it away
and provided a new motor block. The laborer also kept the assembler supplied
with an adequate number of parts and components. Here, the division of labor
was relatively primitive—essentially, the skilled and unskilled. Under normal con-
ditions, a Ford motor assembler needed almost a full day of work to complete a
single engine.
Mass production involved breaking down the manufacturing process into a series of el-
ementary tasks and the transfer of skill to machines. Frederick W. Taylor wrote in 1903
that “no more should a mechanic be allowed to do the work for which a trained laborer can
be used” and that “a man with only the intelligence of an average laborer can be taught
the most diﬃcult and arduous work if it is repeated; and this lower mental caliber renders
him more fit than the mechanic to stand the monotony of repetition.” A 1912 report of the
American Society of Mechanical Engineers stated that “after the traditional skill of a trade,
or the peculiar skill of a designer or inventor, has been transferred to a machine, an operator
with little or no previously acquired skill can learn to handle it and turn oﬀ the product.”
An 1891 sample of metal-working establishments in Detroit shows the importance of
skilled labor in artisanal production. As Table 1 illustrates, mechanics accounted for 40%
of the workforce. Meyer (1981) feels that this pattern would have been characteristic of the
early Ford Motor Company as well. The composition of the workforce at the Ford Motor
Company had changed by 1913, as shown in Table 2. Operators made up the majority of
workers. These were unskilled specialists performing routine machine operations. Mechanics
accounted for only a small portion of the workforce. The deskilling of the workforce is nicely
related by Wolmack et al. (1990, pg. 31):
The assembler on Ford’s mass production line had only one task—to put two
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nuts on two bolts or perhaps attach one wheel to each car. He didn’t order parts,
procure his tools, repair his equipment, inspect for quality, or even understand
what the workers on either side of him were doing. Rather, he kept his head
down and thought about other things. The fact that he might not even speak
the same language as his fellow assemblers or the foreman was irrelevant for the
success of Ford’s system.
Only a few minutes of training was required to teach someone to be an assembler. This
system of manufacturing rapidly diﬀused through the American economy. The pinnacle of
the mass production era was 1955.
Before proceeding on to a discussion about the decline of unionization, a caveat is in order.
While the analysis here stresses the role that mass production played in driving unionization,
changes in labor laws undoubtedly contributed to the very rapid rise in unionization that
occurred during the 1930s and 1940s. The shifts in labor laws for this period are chronicled
in Ohanian (2009). He also analyzes their impact on the Great Depression. Union wages
were required to be paid on federal public works contracts by the Davis—Bacon Act in 1931.
The Norris—Laguardia Act, which was passed in 1932, limited the power of courts to issue
injunctions against union strikes, picketing, or boycotts. It also outlawed “yellow dog”
contracts. These contracts prohibited workers from joining a union; they could be fired if
they did. The Wagner Act of 1935 provided for collective bargaining and placed very few
restrictions on the rights of workers to strike. Some of the rights that unions had won during
the 1930s were rolled by back by the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947. It outlawed closed shops,
required an 80 day notice for strikes, allowed states to pass right to work laws, among other
things. Of course, the dawning of the mass production era may have provided a catalyst
for enacting such laws. Doepke and Tertilt (2009) discuss how technological progress, which
increased the importance of education, may have led to an expansion of women’s rights.
Similarly, one could argue that a rise in the strength of unions may increase the demand
for technologies that place less reliance on unionized labor. All of these considerations are
abstracted from here.
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2.2 The Fall of Unions, 1955-
In 1952 MIT publicly demonstrated an automatic milling machine. The machine read in-
structions from a paper punch tape. The instructions were fed to servo-motors guiding the
position of the cutting head of the machine relative to the part being manufactured along the
,  and  axes. Feedback from sensors regulated the process. By changing the instructions
the machine could manufacture a diﬀerent part. Such a “flexible machine” could make small
batches of many diﬀerent parts. The world had entered the age of numerically controlled
machines. Numerically controlled machines were slow to catch on. The MIT machine would
not have been reliable for commercial production; it had 250 vacuum tubes, 175 relays, and
numerous moving parts. Programming an early numerically controlled machine was a time
consuming task. Standardized languages had been developed for programming automated
machine tools by the 1960s. At the same time, the arrival of less expensive computers in
the 1960s made them economical. The separation of software from hardware also lowered
the costs of implementing numerical control systems. As calculating power increased, com-
puters could aid the design of products (CAD). Computers could also be used for planning
and managing business in addition to running the machines on the factory floor (computer-
aided manufacturing or CAM). In fact, sometimes they could automate virtually the entire
business (computer-integrated manufacturing or CIM). The use of computers reduced the
need for unskilled labor in factories and oﬃces.
Mass production is an inflexible system. It is diﬃcult to change a product or the man-
ufacturing procedure once an assembly line has been instituted. As Henry Ford said “Any
customer can have a car painted any color that he wants so long as it is black.” This didn’t
suit Japanese manufacturing in the early postwar period, which had small production runs.
The dies (or the forms) used in presses to shape metal parts had to be switched frequently.
It took specialists in an American plant a day to change dies. Dies weighed tons and had
to be set in the presses with absolute precision. Otherwise, defects would appear in the
manufactured parts. In the 1940s and 50s, Taiichi Ohno, Toyota’s chief production engineer,
perfected a simple system where they could be changed in minutes. Since the presses had to
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remain idle while the dies where changed, Ohno reasoned that the production workers could
do this. Furthermore, they could check the manufactured parts for defects thereby catching
mistakes early on in production process. Quality control was at the end of the process in the
typical mass production facility. Over time, Toyota’s production system gradually evolved
to one where teams of workers were responsible for segments of the assembly line. Besides
production, they looked after housekeeping, minor machine repairs and quality checking for
their section of the line. According to Wolmack et al. (1990), in a mass production automo-
bile plant about 20% of area and 25% of working time are devoted to fixing mistakes. This
is eliminated in a Toyota “lean production” facility. The Toyota production system favors
skilled workers rather than unskilled ones. It has now been widely adopted in manufacturing.
The upshot of computerization in production and new organizational structures was that
the demand for unskilled labor fell relative to the demand for skilled labor. This is shown in
Figure 2, where unskilled workers are defined as clerical workers, laborers, operatives, and
sales personnel, while skilled ones are taken to be craftsmen, managers, and professionals.
2.3 Proneness of Unionized Industries and Occupations to Em-
ployment Decline
Skill-biased technological progress favored unskilled labor during the first part of the 20th
century. Since unskilled labor is more homogenous than skilled labor, it is easier to orga-
nize. Therefore, unionization tended to be more concentrated in occupations and industries
that attracted unskilled labor. While the first part of the 20th century witnessed a rise in
unionization, starting in the mid-1950’s skill-biased technological change dislocated unskilled
workers replacing them with mixes of capital and skilled workers. Therefore, in the second
half of the century, industries and professions with higher initial unionization rates should
in general exhibit lower growth (or even decline) in employment than those with lower ini-
tial unionization rates, because the former industries and professions had disproportionately
bigger shares of unskilled labor.
Some observations from the Union Membership and Coverage Database support this
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hypothesis—the Appendix contains a description of the various data sources used in this
paper. Over the period 1973 to 2012, the non-agricultural private-sector union membership
rate in the U.S. declined from 24.6% to 6.6%. The decline was more pronounced in the
manufacturing and construction sectors. Over the same period, the union membership rate
fell from 38.9% to 9.6% in the former, and from 39.5% to 13.2% in the latter. Now, highly
unionized occupations were especially hard hit. Table 3 lists the unionization rates for the
20 fastest declining and growing occupations between 1983 and 2002, the period for which
unionization rates are available for finer industry and occupation classes.3 The 20 fastest
declining occupations consist mainly of laborers, machine operators, and clerical workers.
As many as 9 of these occupations had a 1983 unionization rate that was in the top quartile
of the 1983 unionization rates across occupations. In contrast, of the 20 fastest growing
occupations, only 4 had unionization rates that were in the top quartile. The fastest growing
occupations largely pertain to skilled technical workers, such as engineers, managers, and
other professionals.
Is the pattern in Table 3 more general? Have industries and occupations with higher
initial unionization rates in 1983 generally experienced greater employment losses between
1983 and 2002? The answer should be yes, if skill-biased technological change reduced
the demand for unskilled labor, which in turn was disproportionately represented in the
unionized sector of the economy. In other words, the initial unionization rate in an industry
or occupation can be viewed as a proxy for the degree of proneness of that industry or
occupation to employment loss due to skill-biased technological change.
Figure 3 presents nonparametric local polynomial smoothing and linear regression esti-
mates of the relationship between the growth rate in employment in an occupation between
1983 and 2002 and the initial percentage unionization rate.4 The initial unionization rate
3 The employment () growth rates are calculated using the robust growth measure e = 100× 2(2002−
1983)(2002+1983), which is related to the commonly used growth rate,  = 100×(2002−1983)1983, viae = 2(2 + ). The focus on 1983-2002 period is primarily due to the fact that industry and occupation
codes after 2002 are not consistent with those during this period.
4 As in Table 3, in the regressions the employment growth rates are calculated using the robust growth
measure e = 100× 2(2002 − 1983)(2002 + 1983). The implied growth rates,  of employment based on
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is measured in two ways: the employment share of union members within an occupation,
and the share covered by a union. Both the nonparametric and the linear fits in Figure
3 indicate a statistically significant negative association between employment growth in an
occupation and the initial unionization rate. Over the sample period of 20 years, the slopes
of the linear fits imply that a 10 percentage point increase in the initial union membership
rate is associated with roughly a 16 percentage point decline in employment growth, and
a 10 percentage point increase in the initial union coverage rate is associated with a 15
percentage point decline in employment growth.
Figure 4 repeats the analysis in Figure 3 for private-sector industries. The main conclu-
sion from Figure 3 prevails. Employment growth is negatively associated with the extent
of initial unionization, although this relationship is somewhat noisier at the higher end of
unionization where data is sparse. The linear fit implies that a 10 percentage point increase
in the initial union membership rate is associated with a decline of 17 percentage points in
employment growth. Similarly, employment growth is lower by 16 percentage points when
the initial union coverage rate increases by 10 percentage points.
This preliminary investigation supports the hypothesis that in recent times more union-
ized industries and occupations have been more prone to employment loss. These findings,
however, are suggestive, and they constitute only indirect evidence on the connection be-
tween unionization and technological change. The statistical analysis conducted in Section
7 provides more direct evidence on the link between skill-biased technological change and
unionization in light of the model presented next.
3 The Setting
Imagine a world inhabited by a representative family with tastes given by
∞X
=1
−1 ln c with 0    1,
the regressions are backed out from the estimated growth rates for e.
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where c represents household consumption in period .5 The family is made up of a
continuum of members with a mass of one. Each household member supplies one unit of
labor. A fraction  of these members are skilled, the rest unskilled.6 A skilled worker earns
the wage rate . Unskilled members may work in the unionized part of the labor force or
in the non-unionized one. A unionized worker earns the wage rate , while a non-unionized
one receives . The fraction of unskilled household members that work during period 
in the unionized part of the labor force is , a variable that is determined in equilibrium.
The household saves in the form of physical capital, k. A unit of physical capital earns the
rental  in period . Capital depreciates over time at the rate . Finally, the household
earns profits, π, from the firms that it owns.
There is a unit mass of firms in the economy. In period  a firm produces output, ,
according to the production function
 =  [ + (1− )()] with 0  +   1
where  represents the amount of capital hired,  denotes the input of unskilled labor and
 is the quantity of skilled labor. The variable  is a neutral shift factor for the technology
that is common across firms. The variable  is assumed to grow at the constant rate ;
specifically,  = 0. A firm-specific shift factor is given by   1. This denotes a firm’s
5 Variables in bold represent economy-wide aggregates that will need to be distinguished from the anal-
ogous firm-level quantities. One can think of aggregate consumption as the total of all households’ con-
sumptions. Similarly, the aggregate capital stock and level of profits represent the sum of capital stocks and
profits across all firms, respectively.
6 The relative supply of skilled versus unskilled labor is assumed to be fixed over time. There is no doubt
that supply shifts have occurred over the course of history, in particular due both to changes in the return
from and the cost of an education (the latter due to changes in its public provision). The model abstracts
from these supply eﬀects. Research on the evolution of the skilled-to-non-skilled wage premium over the
20th century indicates that skill-biased technological change played a very important role—see Goldin and
Katz (2008) and Krusell et al. (2000). More generally, Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997) document how
times of rapid technological progress are often associated with shifts in the income distribution. The concept
of skill cannot be mapped straightforwardly into years of education. As Goldin and Katz (2008) note, a high
school degree would have been considered well-educated in 1915, while to be labeled this today would require
a college degree or more. See Restuccia and Vandebroucke (2011) for a model of the rise in educational
attainment.
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type and is drawn at the beginning of time from a Pareto distribution
 ∼  () ≡ +1  for   1
where  is the density function for a Pareto distribution.
Observe that skilled and unskilled labor are aggregated via a CES production function.
The technology variables  and  change over time and will capture the notion of skill-
biased technological change.7 There are diminishing returns to scale in production (since
 +   1). There is a fixed cost  associated with operating a firm. This fixed cost
is assumed to grow at a constant rate,  = 0()1(1−). The growth rate is the one at
which output and wages will grow along a balanced growth path in the model. That is,
one would expect the fixed cost of setting up a firm to keep pace with the cost of labor in
a growing economy. The combination of diminishing returns to scale in production and a
fixed operating cost ensure that it is not desirable to organize all the firms in the economy.
Finally, there is a union in the economy. The union organizes unskilled labor in firms. An
organized firm must use union workers for unskilled labor. The union believes in equality so
all union members are paid the same wage, . Unionization is a costly activity. Specifically,
the period- cost of organizing is given by the quadratic function
2
2

where  is the number of union members. These costs are recovered from the membership
in the form of dues, . Skilled labor is not unionized. In the real world, this may be
because skilled labor is too heterogenous in nature to be organized eﬀectively to bargain for
a common wage. The union is given the following set of preferences:
∞X
=1
−1( −  − )1− , with 0     1.
These preferences presume that the union has two regards. It values the surplus that a
union member will earn over a non-unionized worker,  −  − , as well as the number
7 It may be uncommon to let  vary over time. Rios-Rull and Santaeulalia-Llopis (2010) use a similar
approach in their study of how labor’s share of income fluctuates over the business cycle.
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of unionized workers, , that will receive it. As will be seen, there is a trade-oﬀ between
these two regards.
4 Decision Problems
4.1 Households
The problem facing the representative family is standard, with due alteration for the setting
under study. Specifically, the household desires to maximize its lifetime utility subject to
the budget constraint it faces each period. This problem reads
max
{ck+1}∞=1
∞X
=1
−1 ln c P(1)
subject to
c + k+1 = (1−  −) +( − ) +  + ( + 1− )k + π (for  = 1 2 · · · )
In the above maximization problem the household takes the number of union members, ,
as given. Since −   , it would like as many unskilled household members as possible
to be employed in union firms.
4.2 Firms
A firm in period  hires capital, , and skilled and unskilled labor,  and , to maximize
profits. The firm’s period- choice problem is
 () = Π (;  ·) ≡ max  {(

 )[( )+(1− )( )]−  −  − }− ,
for  = . P(2)
With some abuse of notation, the variable  in superscript form will denote whether the
firm is unionized ( = ) or not ( = ), while the variable  in regular form will represent
the wage rate (again for  = ). Now, express the solution to the above problem for the
amount of unskilled labor that a type- firm will hire at the wage rate  by  () =  (;  ·),
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for  = —the “·” represents the other arguments that enter the function , which are
suppressed to keep the subsequent presentation simple. Likewise, represent the amount of
capital and skilled labor hired by  () =  (;  ·) and  () =  (;  ·). The amount
of output produced by a firm is denoted by  () =  (;  ·) and its profits are written as
 () = Π (;  ·).
Production is not a forgone conclusion due to the presence of the fixed operation cost,
. A firm will only produce if it makes nonnegative profits. Thus, it must transpire that in
equilibrium
 () = Π (;  ·) ≥ 0 for  = .
Denote the period- threshold value for , at which it is just profitable for a firm to produce,
by  . This threshold value solves the equation
Π ( ;  ·) = 0 for  = . (1)
It should be clear that Π ( ;  ·)  0 for    and Π ( ;  ·)  0 for    .
From the two first-order conditions associated with hiring labor, it transpires that

 = [


(1− )
 ×

 ]
1(1−), for  = . (2)
The ratio of skilled to unskilled labor,  , in a firm depends on the price of unskilled
labor relative to skilled labor, . It also depends on the skill-biased technology term
 (1 − ). This term captures the notion of skill-biased technological change in the
model. When  (1− ) is low, either because  is small or  is high, unskilled labor is
favored, relatively speaking. The benefit of unionizing unskilled workers will be large.
Now consider the move toward assembly line production at the beginning of the 20th
century (and away from the artisanal production techniques of the 19th century). This is
portrayed in Figure 5, where the (absolute value of the) slope of an isoquant is given by
[(1 − ) ]( )1−. A movement toward assembly line techniques can be represented
by an upward shift in [(1− ) ], due either to a fall in  or a rise in . It will cause the
slope of an isoquant to increase along a ray from the origin. This is shown by the shift in
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the isoquant from  to  . As a consequence, at a given skill ratio, an extra unit of unskilled
labor becomes more valuable in terms of skilled labor. If factor prices remained fixed, then
the firm would substitute away from skilled labor toward unskilled labor, as reflected by the
movement from  to 0 in the diagram.
4.3 The Union
Recall that the union has two regards. First, it values the surplus over the competitive
wage that union members earn. Second, it also puts worth on the number of workers that
will earn the union wage. It is intuitive that the union should organize the firms with the
highest level of productivity first. They can better aﬀord to pay the union premium and
provide larger employment to union. There is a limit to the wage that the union can set.
Specifically, a unionized firm must earn nonnegative profits. So, if any unionized firm earns
zero profits then all firms with a higher level of productivity will be unionized and those with
a lower level will not. Because more productive firms are also larger in the model, the union
organizes larger firms. This prediction of the model is consistent with studies indicating
higher likelihood of unionization among larger firms.8
Now, turn to the optimization problem faced by a union. Assume that the profits of the
last firm unionized are squeezed to zero. The number of unionized workers in period , ,
will be given by
 =
Z ∞

 (; ·) () (3)
The dues paid by a union member, , are
 = 
2
2 =
[R∞  (; ·) ()]
2
 (4)
The union’s decision problem appears as
max
{ }∞=1
∞X
=1
{ −
[R∞  (; ·) ()]
2
− }[
Z ∞

 (; ·) ()]1− P(3)
8 Dinlersoz, Greenwood, and Hyatt (2013) find that in the U.S. the likelihood of unionization increases
with a firm’s productivity, as proxied by both firm size and age. Fang and Heywood (2006) also find that in
Canada unionized plants are larger.
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subject to the zero-profit constraint (1) holding (when  = ) for the marginal union firm,
 .9 When solving its problem, the union takes the wages for non-unionized unskilled and
skilled labor,  and , as given.
Is it possible that the union won’t pick the wage rate so that the threshold firm earns
zero profits? The answer is no. Suppose that the marginal firm earned positive profits. The
cost of raising the union wage incrementally is the loss of membership that will occur from
all of the inframarginal firms. It turns out, though, that this loss can be made up for by
increasing the number of unionized firms or lowering  . How far can  be raised and 
simultaneously lowered? At some point the firms with the lowest  will no longer be able to
earn profits due to the presence of the fixed cost . Then the process must stop. Without
the fixed cost, , every firm would be unionized. In this situation, all firms would earn some
profits, albeit for some of them profits might be infinitesimally small. In general not all of
the unskilled work force will be hired.
Lemma 1 (Zero profits for the marginal firm) The union always picks the wage rate, , so
that the zero-profit constraint (1) is binding (when  = ) for the last firm organized.
Proof. See Appendix.
The union’s two regards must be traded oﬀ in the maximization problem P(3). By
applying the envelope theorem to a unionized firm’s optimization problem P(2), for  = ,
it can be easily calculated from equation (1) that

 =
( ; ·)
  ( ; ·)  0
This implies that lowering the threshold hold,  , or equivalently unionizing more firms, can
only be accomplished by reducing the union wage, . Additionally, it can be seen from
9 Rudanko and Krusell (2012) also focus on a monopoly union, but take a Nash bargaining approach.
Their analysis focuses on how unionization (and the ability to commit to contracts) impacts on unemployment
and wages in a frictional labor market. For the analysis undertaken here, which abstracts away from issues of
eﬃciency, the exact model of unionization probably doesn’t matter too much. What does matter, however,
is how the union values membership, an issue with or without bargaining, which determines the tradeoﬀ
between membership and wages. Observations on union membership and the wage premium are used to tie
this down here.
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equation (4) that a rise in membership,  = R∞  (; ·) (), comes at the expense
of higher dues, , because of the increasing costs involved with unionization.
5 Equilibrium
In equilibrium the markets for capital, labor and goods must clear. Equilibrium in the
capital market requires thatZ 

 () () +
Z ∞

 () () = k (5)
The market-clearing condition for skilled labor isZ 

 () () +
Z ∞

 () () =  (6)
while that for unskilled labor readsZ 

 () () +
Z ∞

 () () = 1−  (7)
Last, equilibrium in the goods market implies
c + k+1 + +  =
Z 

 () () +
Z ∞

 () () + (1− )k (8)
Note that the aggregate amount of union dues, , appears in the resource constraint.
These exactly cover the resource cost of organizing— see (4).
A definition of the equilibrium under study will now be presented to take stock of the
situation so far.
Definition 2 (Definition of a competitive equilibrium) A competitive equilibrium is a time
path for consumption and savings, {ck+1}∞=1, a set of labor and capital allocations for
union ( = ) and non-union ( = ) firms { ()  ()  ()}∞=1, a set of factor prices
{   }∞=1, a sequence for union dues, {}∞=1, and a sequence determining the thresh-
old points for union and non-union firms, {   }∞=1, such that for a given time profile for
technology {   }∞=1:
1. The time path for consumption and savings, {ck+1}∞=1, solves the representative
household’s problem, P(1), given the time path for factor prices, {   }∞=1,
profits, π = R   () () + R∞  () (), and the size of the union sector, = R∞  () ().
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2. The time paths for firms’ input utilizations, { ()  ()  ()}∞=1, solve their profit
maximization problems, as specified by P(2), given the time paths for factor prices,
{  }∞=1 (for  = ) and technology {   }∞=1.
3. The sequences for union wages, {}∞=1 and the threshold, { }∞=1, solve the union’s
problem P(3), given the time paths for factor prices, {  }∞=1 (for  = ),
technology, {   }∞=1, and the solution to the unionized firm’s problem,  () = (; ·) and  () = Π (; ·), as implied by P(2). The sequence for union dues,
{}∞=1, is determined in line with (4).
4. The sequence for non-union thresholds, { }∞=1, solves (1) when  = , given  () =Π (; ·) from P(2) and the time paths for factor prices, {  }∞=1, and technol-
ogy, {   }∞=1.
5. The markets for capital, labor and goods, all clear so that equations (5) to (8) hold.
6 Simulation Analysis
6.1 Calibration
Before the model can be simulated, values must be assigned for its parameters. Table 6
lists the parameter values. The period is taken to be five years. Accordingly, the discount
factor is set so  = 1(104)5 ' 082, which implies an annual interest rate of 4%. This
is a standard value. The annual depreciation rate for capital is taken to be 008, another
standard value. Likewise, labor’s share of income is set at 60%, implying  = 060, a typical
value if one assumes that part of the capital stock includes intangibles. Note that a firm’s
production function exhibits diminishing returns to scale. Guner, Ventura and Xi (2008)
estimate that the share of profits in output is 20%. Capital’s share of income, , is therefore
set at 020. Katz and Murphy (1992) estimate that the elasticity of substitution between
skilled and unskilled labor is 1.4, corresponding to a value of 029 for .
The rest of the model’s parameters are selected so that a steady state for the model
hits 5 data targets for the year 1955, roughly the peak year of the unionization movement
(see Figure 1). This involves computing the model’s steady state in conjunction with the 5
data targets, while taking the 5 parameters 1955, 1955, ,  and  as additional variables.
The technology variable  is normalized so that 1955 = 1. While the nonlinear system of
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equations used to calibrate the model is simultaneous in nature, certain parameters play a
key role in matching each of the data targets. The five data targets and their importance
for identifying the five parameters are discussed now.
The first target is the union membership rate of 37% in 1955. Therefore, the steady state
is computed subject to the restriction
1955 = 037 T(1)
The weight on the extent of membership in the union’s objective function, 1 − , plays a
key role in attaining this target.
Let the top 10% of the population represent skilled labor. Thus,  = 010. The share
of the top 10% of the work force in earnings was 032 in 1955. Therefore, the steady state
must satisfy the equation below for the second target
1955
19551955 + (1−1955 − )1955 + 1955 = 032 T(2)
Not surprisingly, the constant term on unskilled labor in the production function, 1955, is
important for hitting this objective.
Union dues are assumed to amount to 1% of a union member’s wages. MacDonald and
Robinson (1992, p 47) state that this is a reasonable value. Indeed, this is exactly what the
UAW currently charges salaried workers. Thus, the third target can be expressed as
1955
1955 = 001 T(3)
The term  in the union’s cost function is instrumental in meeting this target.
The distribution of employment across establishments in the U.S. is highly skewed and
dispersed. Based on the Longitudinal Business Database of the U.S. Census Bureau, the
coeﬃcient of variation (cv) of employment across U.S. establishments with at least one
employee had an average value of approximately 7 over the period 1976-2011, varying in a
narrow band of 6 to 8.10 The average value of 7 is used to provide guidance for the choice of
10 See Appendix for the calculation of the descriptive statistics for the establishment-size distribution.
Using less granular data, Henley and Sanchez (2009, p 427) report a coeﬃcient of variation of 8 for 1974
and find that it remained relatively constant after that.
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the Pareto distribution parameter, .11 Note that in the U.S., unionization tends to occur
at the establishment level and not the firm level, so the cv of establishment employment is
the appropriate statistic to use. In the model there is no distinction between establishments
and firms. The fourth target is represented by
cv( + ) = 7 T(4)
Last, in classic work, H. Greg Lewis (1963) reported that the wage premium from union
membership was 15%. Here, Card, Lemieux, and Riddell’s (2003, Table 4) more recent
estimate of 20% is used. This implies the final equation for the fifth target
1955
1955 = 120 T(5)
Remember that the last firm unionized earns zero profits when it pays the union wage, ,
and incurs the fixed cost, . This condition can be used to back out the fixed cost in 1955,
1955.
6.2 Results
Can the model explain the ∩-shaped pattern of union membership along with the ∪-shaped
profile for income inequality over the 20th century? To investigate this question requires
inputting in a time series process for technology, { }2000=1910. A perfect foresight path for
the model is calculated using a variant of the Fair and Taylor (1983) algorithm, which is
useful for computing saddle path solutions for two-point boundary value problems. The Fair
and Taylor (1983) algorithm is a relative of the multiple shooting algorithm used to solve
diﬀerence equation systems. The first boundary condition for the economy is the initial
capital stock, while the second one is capital stock associated with the terminal steady
state.
The process for { }2000=1910 is constructed in a crude way. Steady states for the model
are computed for 1910 and 2000, the starting and ending years for the simulation analysis.
11 Note that picking the coeﬃcient of variation for a Pareto random variable implies that the mean
and variance are also simultaneously matched, because the mean, variance and coeﬃcient of variation are
uniquely defined by the single parameter, , of the Pareto distribution.
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Union membership and income inequality are taken as targets for these years. Solutions
for  and  that hit these targets are backed out, while holding all other parameter values
fixed. Assume that  and  are separately quadratic in . Each quadratic will have three
parameters. Fit these two quadratics to the triplets (1910 1955 2000) and (1910 1955 2000),
respectively. The resulting time profile for skill-biased technological change, as represented
by [ (1 − )]1(1−), is shown in Figure 6. After the year 2000 all technological change
is shut oﬀ. The capital stocks associated with the 1910 and 2000 steady states are taken
as the initial and terminal capital stocks when computing the transitional dynamics for the
model, although the model needs to be run for somewhat more than 90 years to reach the
final steady state.
Is the pattern of skill-biased technological change shown in Figure 6 reasonable? The
skill-biased term drops by a factor of 1.5 from peak to trough. Over the 1910 to 2000 period
real per-capita income grew by 2.1% a year. This implies that real per-capita GDP rose by
a factor of 6.7. To achieve this in the model, the parameter governing neutral technological
change, , must rise by a factor of 2000−1910 = 671− = 46, which implies  = 1017 or that
 growths at 1.7% a year. The fixed cost, , needs to rise by a factor of 6.7 if the economy
is to remain on a balanced growth path in the absence of changes in  and . Therefore,
the required amount of skill-biased technological change is smaller than the required amount
of neutral technological change, as Figure 6 illustrates.
The framework does a good job accounting for the rise and fall in union membership,
as Figure 7 illustrates. It misses membership at the peak of the union movement, but
not by much. It also mimics the fall and rise in income inequality as well. This is shown
in Figure 8. In the analysis, skill-biased technological change is the sole driver of both
the ∩-shaped time series for unionization and the ∪-shaped one for income inequality; i.e.,
the ∪-shaped pattern in income inequality is not caused by the ∩-shaped time series for
unionization. By this account, very little of postwar rise in inequality can be accounted
for by the decline in unionization.12 Goldin and Katz (2008), Greenwood and Yorukoglu
12 A drop in unionization has a minor impact on income inequality in the model. As will be seen in the
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(1997), and Krusell at el. (2000) all stress technological change as a force underlying shifts
in the income distribution.
6.3 Welfare Cost of Unions
So, what is the welfare cost of unions? Rees (1963) asked this question a long time ago.
He found that the welfare loss from unions in 1957 amounted to 0.14% of GDP. The model
developed here can also be used to address this question. Suppose that the model economy
is resting in its 1955 steady state, the peak of the union power. Now, eliminate unions. The
model would then imply a welfare increase of 0.66% of GDP. While this is 4.7 times as big
as Rees’s number, it is paltry.
Figure 9 illustrates the situation in an alternative Reesian fashion. The picture draws
the demands for unskilled labor by both union and non-union firms. These demands must
sum up to 0.9, the size of the unskilled labor force as a proportion of the total labor force. In
the economy without unions, the union firms would hire unskilled labor amounting to 49.6%
of the total labor force at the competitive wage rate . Unions increase this wage to . As
a consequence, unionized firms cut their employment of unskilled labor from 49.6% of the
total labor force to 36.7%. This leads to a welfare loss measured by the area . But, the
labor displaced by union firms is picked up by non-union ones. The wage rate for nonunion
labor falls from  to . The gain in welfare from the increased employment by non-union
firms is represented by the area . The net loss is the area in the triangle . This
triangle represents the diﬀerence in productivities between the unionized and non-unionized
firms. It amounts to 05 × 020 ×  × (0496 − 0367). Expressing this as a percentage of
next section, this is due to the facts that: (i) the union wage premium is of moderate size; (ii) it applies to a
relatively small part of the aggregate wage bill; (iii) a fall in union wages for unskilled workers implies a rise
in nonunion wages. Hence, a drop in unionization does not account for the large observed shifts in income
inequality in the model. In fact, if one assumes that all unskilled workers get the non-union wage then the
plot obtained for the income distribution looks virtually identical to that displayed in Figure 8.
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aggregate output, o, gives
100%× 05× 020×  × (0496− 0367)
o
= 100%× 05× 020×  × 0367
o| {z }
00305
×(0496− 0367)
0367| {z }
0351
= 054%
This number is very close to the model-based figure of 0.66% It is easy to see why this
number is small. First, the union premium, 020, only applies to small part of wage bill
expressed as a fraction of output,  × 0367o. This represents the base of the triangle.
Second, the proportional shift in union labor, (0496−0367)0367 ' 035, is not that large.
This is the height of the triangle.
The fact that the welfare cost of unions is so small does not imply that they have little
eﬀect on the economy. The impact of unions is restricted here by the assumption that firms
are competitive. Whether or not this is a good approximation for the U.S. economy across
the time period studied is an open question. Perfect competition limits the wages that
unions can obtain. Unions are more likely to have a large impact on economic activity when
they are negotiating with producers that have monopoly power. This was the case in U.S.
iron ore industry prior to the 1970s. After this time, producers faced intense competition
from foreign exporters. Schmitz (2005) documents how this increased competition led to a
large rise in labor productivity. Firms were forced to abandon the productivity-hindering
work practices that they had negotiated with unions earlier. His analysis might also apply
at points in time to the aircraft, airline, auto industries, for example. Similarly, Cole and
Ohanian (2004) study the impact unions had on the economy during the Great Depression.
They stress the cartelization of industries allowed by Roosevelt under the New Deal, which
were then abandoned prior to World War II. Taschereau-Dumouchel (2011) argues that just
the threat of unionization may be enough to generate large welfare costs. To keep unions out,
firms have to oﬀer high wages to low-skilled workers in his model. Finally, Alder, Lagakos
and Ohanian (2013) suggest that union power played an important role in the decline of the
rust belt.
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7 Empirical Evidence
Is skill-biased technological change, as highlighted in the model, an empirically relevant
factor in the decline of unionization in the U.S.? This question will be examined in two
ways. First, the model predicts that the ratio of skilled labor to non-skilled labor should
increase with skill-biased technological change. This implication can be seen directly from
equation (2): the ratio  is positively related to the term that captures skill-biased
technological change,  (1− ). Second, the fraction of the labor force that is unionized,
, is negatively related to skill-biased technological progress, as the simulation analysis
established. To test these two predictions, a measure of skill-biased technological change is
needed.
Measures of skill-biased technological progress are diﬃcult to come by. The macroeco-
nomics literature, in particular Krusell at el. (2000), suggests that the relative price of new
capital goods is one measure. In an influential paper, Solow (1960) argued that technological
progress is embodied in the form of new capital goods, which is now commonly referred to
as investment-specific technological progress. Investment-specific technological progress is
incarnated in new technologies, such as more powerful computers, faster and more eﬃcient
means of telecommunication, and numerically-controlled industrial machines. As new tech-
nologies come on line, they tend to become less expensive due to process innovation and the
entry of competitors. Greenwood, Hercowitz and Krusell (1997) illustrate how investment-
specific technological progress manifests itself in the form of decreasing relative prices for
new capital goods, measured in terms of consumption goods. Similarly, Krusell at el. (2000)
suggest that the decline in the relative price of capital goods is a driver of skill-biased tech-
nological progress. Now, diﬀerent industries use diﬀerent mixes of capital goods, and the
level and growth rate of prices associated with these mixes of goods diﬀer across industries
and over time. This variation will be exploited to explore the link between skill-biased tech-
nological change and unionization. If skill-biased technological change is embodied in the
form of capital goods, then those industries where the price of capital goods is lower should
in general have lower unionization rates. Furthermore, a faster decline in the price of new
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capital goods should imply a faster rate of deunionization.
Calculating the relative price of capital goods in quality-adjusted terms at the industry
level is not a straightforward task. Cummins and Violante (2002) have done this calculation
for equipment and software (E&S). Their price series will be used here.13 E&S include four
major groups: industrial equipment, transportation equipment, oﬃce information processing
equipment, and other equipment. Technological progress in E&S is viewed as complementing
skilled workers more so than unskilled workers. Compared with other candidate measures,
such as the stock of E&S or real investment in E&S, the Cummins and Violante (2002)
relative price measure has some advantages. It takes into account the quality improvements
in E&S over time, and it measures the quality-adjusted price of E&S with respect to the price
of constant-quality consumption goods. The connections between skill-biased technological
progress and investment in E&S, or the stock of E&S, are likely to be more ambiguous in
nature. An increase in E&S investment or stock may be associated, for instance, with an
expansion in industry output, but not necessarily with an advance in technology favoring
skilled workers. Furthermore, as higher quality and more advanced E&S becomes available
at lower prices, conventionally-measured E&S investment or stock may not show much of a
rise, and could even decrease. Investment and the capital stock are also more susceptible
to endogeneity issues at the industry level, whereas the rapid decline in the relative price
of E&S used by an industry is likely to occur from technological progress in the overall
economy, which can be taken as exogenous with respect to the process of unionization and
the composition of skill in a narrowly defined industry. For instance, if inventory management
software constitutes a large share of software used in a narrowly defined industry, the decline
in the relative price of this software due to its general diﬀusion in the rest of the economy
can have a disproportionate eﬀect on this industry’s employment, but unionization in the
industry is not going to be the main driver of the relative price of the software in the economy.
The relative price series constructed by Cummins and Violante (2002) indeed exhibit
significant variation both across industries and over years during the period 1983-1999 for
13 See Cummins and Violante (2002) for the details on the construction of this relative price series.
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which industry-level unionization and the relative price of E&S are consistently available.
In 1983, the relative price of E&S had a mean of 035 and a standard deviation of 019
across industries used for the empirical analysis below. By 1999, the mean had declined to
016 and the standard deviation was 012 All industries exhibited a decline in the relative
price. The growth rates of relative prices over the period 1983-1999 also vary considerably.
The industries in the analysis experienced an average decline of 60% in the relative price of
E&S, with a standard deviation of 10% The largest decline occurred in air transportation
industry (81%), and the smallest decline was in farms (29%)
7.1 Skill Composition and Skill-biased Technological Change
The model relates the skilled-to-unskilled labor ratio to skill-biased technological change.
Consider the logarithm of the firm-level skilled-to-unskilled labor ratio defined by (2)
ln

 =
1
1−  ln 


(1− )
 +
1
1−  ln

 , for  =  (9)
The term  (1−) captures skill-biased technological progress, while  is the relative
price of unskilled labor with respect to skilled labor. Equation (9) implies that when  (1−
) is higher, skill ratio is also higher.
One measure of the skill ratio,  , is the ratio of non-production workers to production
workers in a firm. This ratio is readily available at the industry level annually for manufac-
turing industries from the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database. One may argue
that non-production workers embody more skill or human capital than production workers,
at least on average. Non-production workers include managers, professionals such as engi-
neers and lawyers, and many other employees who are not directly involved in production.14
Non-production workers’ wages are much higher than production workers’ wages.15 Denote
14 See Gujarati and Dars (1972) for a detailed description of these two types of workers, as defined by the
U.S. Census Bureau.
15 For instance, in the 1997 Census of Manufactures, the average wage of production workers was about
$21,000, compared with about $39,000 for non-production workers, a diﬀerence that is also highly statistically
significant. In NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database, the ratio of the average wage of non-production
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by  the ratio of non-production workers to production workers in industry  for year 
Based on (9), consider a panel regression of the form
ln  = +  ln  +  ln e + λ0 lnx +   +  +  (10)
The panel regression (10) is implemented at the industry level.16 In (10),  is the relative
price of equipment and software that measures the state of skill-biased technological change
in industry  for year . Based on the model,  is negative: as the relative price of equipment
and software declines, the skilled-to-non-skilled labor ratio increases. e is the ratio of the
average wage of production workers to that of non-production workers, which has a positive
association with  based on the model.17 x is a vector of industry-year varying controls,
 is a year fixed eﬀect,  is an industry fixed eﬀect, and  is an error term clustered at the
industry level. The fixed-eﬀects specification in (10) can be estimated using the balanced
panel of 19 two-digit manufacturing industries available from the NBER-CES Manufacturing
Industry Database over the sample period 1958− 1999. The relative price is available at the
two-digit SIC code level only, so the analysis is restricted to two-digit SIC code manufacturing
industries.18
workers to that of production workers ranges from 114 to 243 across 2-digit manufacturing industries during
the 1958-1999 period.
16 Note that equation (9) is defined at the firm level. In the model, the ratio  is identical across firms
for a given  =  but diﬀers across unionized and non-unionized firms because of the diﬀerent relative
wages. One could aggregate equation (9) to the industry level. Specifically, let  = (1−) be the fraction
of unskilled labor in unionized firms. The logarithm of the industry-level ratio,  is then given by
ln() = ln [(  ) + (1− )(  )]
= ln[ (1− )]1(1−) + ln[ ()1(1−) + (1− ) ()1(1−)]
This relationship is approximated here by the form given in (10).
17 In the general equilibrium model, the skill premium,  for  =  , is endogenous. Loosely
speaking, it is be a function of the technology parameters   , and the aggregate capital stock, —see
the definition given for a competitive equilibrium. Therefore, the skill premium embeds, in part, the eﬀects
of skill-biased technological change. This would be true in the real world as well, of course. The wage ratioe can also be influenced by other exogenous factors. The inclusion of e in the regression also controls
for the influence that these considerations have on the skill mix through the skill premium.
18 One two-digit industry is not included in the estimation because it is not in the Cummins and Violante
(2002) data. The sample period ends in 1999, the last year for which the relative price measure for industries
is available from Cummins and Violante (2002).
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The controls x include real output to measure the potential eﬀect of industry scale on
. Labor productivity (real output per worker) is also added to x to capture the eﬀect of
general improvements in industry labor productivity on . The model features a firm-level
production technology that exhibits neutral-technological advance in addition to skill-biased
technological progress. Along a balanced growth path, neutral technological change will not
aﬀect . However, the data may exhibit deviations from the clinical model environment.
For instance, imagine a situation where demand is fixed in an industry but there is neu-
tral technological progress. One would expect a fall in this industry’s employment. If the
production technology does not exhibit constant returns to scale, then this fall may have a
diﬀerential impact on skilled versus unskilled labor. Skilled and unskilled labor may have
diﬀerent costs of moving across industries. Hence, variations in industry demands and pro-
duction technologies may induce changes in the relative employments of skilled and unskilled
labor. Industry scale and labor productivity are used as controls for some of these potential
deviations.
The real capital stock and the conventionally-measured real price of investment are also
added as controls. While  does not depend on the capital stock in the model, the data
may exhibit deviations. In a more general formulation, skill-biased technological change
could operate through the capital stock, which is influenced by the price of investment.
Furthermore, if  measures the quality of capital to an extent not possible by conventional
measures of the capital stock and its price, then any significant connection between  and
 should survive the addition of these controls. Finally, in (10), the relative price of E&S,
, is treated as exogenous to . As argued earlier, this may be a reasonable assumption at
the industry level. For a robustness check on this assumption, the regression analysis in (10)
is also implemented using a two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation. The model’s timing
suggests that lagged (period − 1) values of  e, and aggregates such as output, capital,
and labor productivity, are pre-determined and should be orthogonal to the error term in (9)
at time . The instruments used for the main independent variable of interest,  are thus
one-period lagged values of , e, real output, labor productivity, the real capital stock,
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and the real price of investment.19
Between 1958 (near the peak year, 1955, of unionization) and 1999, the average of 
across the two-digit manufacturing industries in the sample grew from 029 to 039 an
increase of 34% In the meantime, the average of  across the same group fell sharply from
083 to 014 a decrease of 83% Table 5 contains the results of the estimation based on (10).
In all the specifications displayed in Table 5, a statistically significant negative association
between  and  emerges. Across specifications with controls (specifications 2 to 10),
a 1% decline in  is connected with a 016% to 041% increase in  The wage ratio,e, is also positively associated with , as expected, and is statistically significant. The
industry elasticity of  with respect to e ranges between 138 to 193.20 The estimated
coeﬃcients of real output and labor productivity vary across specifications, but in general
there does not seem to be a consistently significant link between these two variables and .
The real capital stock is positively associated with  whereas the real price of investment
is negatively related to , although the latter relation is significant only in specification
10. Because  can be viewed as a particular measure of the price of investment/capital,
its connection with  is expected to weaken when other measures related to capital and its
price are included in the regression. This is the case in specifications 7 to 10. Despite this
attenuation, however, the estimated  does not vanish or lose its significance in the presence
of these other measures, suggesting that  may indeed measure the price of equipment to
an extent not captured completely by more conventional measures of capital stock and the
real price of investment, which do not take into account the quality of capital. Overall, Table
5 suggests that the skill-biased technological change measure, , has a negative association
with , as predicted by the model.
19 The first-stage regressions using the instruments indicate high  statistics, and the instruments appear
to be strong in terms of explanatory power for ln . Potential endogeneity of wages, labor productivity and
real output was also addressed by using lagged values as instruments. Any potential bias in the estimated
coeﬃcients of these variables are less crucial, as the primary coeﬃcient of interest is that of ln 
20 This implies an industry-level value for the parameter  in the range 027 to 048, which also contains
the firm-level value  = 029 used in the model’s calibration.
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7.2 Unionization and Skill-biased Technological Change
Next, consider the connection between unionization and skill-biased technological change,
the main relationship of interest. The fraction unionized in the model economy is determined
in general equilibrium by consumers’ consumption/savings decisions, firms’ input choices, the
union’s decisions about wage setting and organizing, and various market-clearing conditions—
see definition (2). This relationship cannot be represented by a simple expression as could
be done for the skill ratio,  . Following (10), unionization in industry  in year , , as
measured either by the percentage of industry employees who are union members or by the
percentage covered by a union, is approximated in a log-linear form as
ln = +  ln  + λ0 lnx + γ 0 ln z +  +  (11)
The fixed-eﬀects specification in (11) can be estimated using a balanced panel of 59 indus-
tries for which unionization and the relative price of equipment and software are available for
the period 1983 to 1999. These industries include the 19 manufacturing industries used in
the previous section plus non-manufacturing industries, and exclude agriculture and public-
sector industries. It is important to assess how the eﬀects of other factors typically associated
with the decline in unionization over time compare with the eﬀects of skill-biased techno-
logical change. For this purpose, (11) is implemented with time-varying covariates z that
capture some of the trends in the U.S. relevant for unionization.
The sign of the estimated  based on (11) is expected to be positive: as the rela-
tive price of equipment and software declines—indicating skill-biased technological progress—
unionization should decline, as the model’s simulation suggests. The controls x include the
number of establishments per capita in an industry, in addition to real output and labor
productivity. The motivation for including real output and labor productivity was discussed
earlier. The number of establishments per capita is intended as a measure of the intensity of
competition. Although the degree of competition is not part of the model which assumes a
competitive environment, more intense competition in general can strip rents from firms that
can otherwise be captured in part by unions. A direct measure of the markup at the industry
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level is not straightforward to construct especially for non-manufacturing industries, so the
number of establishments per capita is used as a proxy. Smaller number of establishments
per capita indicate lower markups, ceteris paribus, and hence should be associated with
lower rents.21 Therefore, a smaller number of establishments per capita should imply lower
unionization.
The variables included in z assess the eﬀects of various nationwide trends on unionization
emphasized by earlier research. The share of part-time employment is included, as part-time
employees are less likely to be union members, and an increase in the reliance on part-time
labor can lead to lower unionization. The fraction of the U.S. population in the south and
west controls for the migration of workers and firms to generally union-unfriendly, right-
to-work law states in these regions.22 This variable is also interacted with a dummy
for manufacturing industries, as these industries were disproportionately aﬀected by firms’
migration to the south. Younger people may also have less friendly attitudes towards unions,
as newer generations are less exposed to a strong union tradition. Therefore, as the fraction of
young people (aged 18 to 45) in the population increases, unionization may decline. Finally,
the trade variables, imports and exports, are both expected to have a negative association
with unionization. Increasing imports or outsourcing adversely aﬀects firms’ output and
employment, and therefore, unions, while escalating exports may signify greater exposure to
foreign competition, which may reduce union rents. Exports may also proxy for the generally
more advanced technology and the higher productivity of exporters, which may rely more
heavily on skilled workers as opposed to unskilled ones.23 These two variables were also
interacted with the dummy for manufacturing, as their eﬀects may have played a greater
role in the decline of manufacturing industries, and unions in manufacturing sector. Similar
to the estimation of (10), the instruments used for the relative price  are the lagged values
of real output, labor productivity, the number of establishments per capita, and the relative
21 See, e.g., Campbell and Hopenhayn (2005) for this connection.
22 See Reder (1988) for a discussion.
23 See Baldwin (2003) for an extensive investigation of the eﬀects of trade on unionization in the U.S.
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price and its square.24
The estimation results are in Table 6. Specifications 1-4 use only ln  as the regressor,
and they yield a positive and significant estimated coeﬃcient for ln . Specifications 5 to
18 include the controls x and z. Specifications 9-12 and 15-18 analyze manufacturing and
non-manufacturing industries separately, to see if there are any diﬀerences in the experiences
of these two broad groups of industries. All but specification 16 result in a positive and
significant estimate for . The estimates of  across specifications 5 to 18 indicate that a
10% decline in  is associated with roughly a 2% to 4% decline in 
The coeﬃcient estimates for the controls are generally consistent across specifications 5 to
18, but only some exhibit statistical significance. The estimated coeﬃcients of imports and
exports generally have the expected negative signs, and they exhibit statistical significance
in some specifications. Output has generally a negative and significant coeﬃcient estimate,
but labor productivity exhibits mixed coeﬃcient estimates. The share of the population in
south and the share of the young in the population have generally negative, and sometimes
significant, coeﬃcients. The interaction term for the population share in south and the
manufacturing dummy exhibits a large negative estimated coeﬃcient, which is generally
statistically significant, as expected. The number of establishments per capita and part-time
employment have coeﬃcient estimates that are mixed in sign and only sometimes significant.
In general, the estimated coeﬃcients of the various controls indicate that factors other than
skill-biased technological change also played an important role in the decline of unionization,
as a large body of prior work indicates. Note also that the coeﬃcient estimates for relative
price in the case of manufacturing sector tend to be stronger than those in non-manufacturing
sector, as indicated by specifications 9-12 and 15-18.
To assess the magnitude of the eﬀect of technological progress on unionization, simple
calculations can be made. The average annual decline in  across industries over the
24 The model again suggests that these lagged values are predetermined and should be orthogonal to the
error term in (11). The  statistics from first stage regressions indicate that these instruments do have high
explanatory power for the potentially endogenous variables productivity, output, and relative price of E&S.
Potential endogeneity of labor productivity and real output was also addressed, as before, by using lagged
values as instruments.
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entire 1983 to 1999 period was about 57%. Suppose that an industry experiences this
average change in  in a linear fashion over the years, holding all other variables fixed.
Then, the annual decline in union membership/coverage rate during the 1983 to 1999 period
attributable only to the decline in , holding all else fixed, amounts to about 12% to 13%
based on specifications 5 to 18 in Table 6. This rate of decline would imply about 17% to 19%
decline in unionization rate from its 1983 value. The average industry union membership
rate in 1983 was 23% Starting at this average, a decline of 17% to 19% would imply an
average union membership rate of 18% to 19% as of 1999. The actual average in 1999 was
about 15%.
A first-diﬀerence regression based on (11) was also run to explore the relationship be-
tween ∆ ln and ∆ ln , as a further robustness check. If the variables used in Table 6
exhibit non-stationarity, then spurious correlations between the dependent variable and the
regressors may result. First-diﬀerencing also helps address this issue.25 The one-period
lagged versions of the instruments for ln  used in Table 6 are used here as instruments for
∆ ln . The results, shown in Table 7, are consistent with the results in Table 6, and in-
dicate a positive and statistically significant association between the change in unionization
rates and the change in the relative price of E&S.
7.3 The Experience of Other Developed Countries
Deunionization is not unique to the U.S. If skilled-biased technological change is widespread
across countries then similar declines should be expected in other developed countries. As
shown in Figure 10, unionization (including both private and public sectors) in several OECD
countries declined, starting usually in the early 1980’s, and even earlier in some cases, notably
25 The stationarity of all the diﬀerenced variables are investigated using panel unit root tests. There is no
strong evidence to conclude against the hypothesis that the panels for the diﬀerenced relative price and union
membership/coverage rates are trend-stationary. The panel unit root tests employed are the Levin-Lin-Chu,
Harris-Tzavalis, Breitung, Im-Pesaran-Shin, Fisher-type tests based on Phillips-Perron, and Hadri LM. For
the first diﬀerence of ln all 5 tests indicate trend-stationarity, both for membership and coverage, at the
1% level. For the first diﬀerence of ln , 4 out of 5 tests conclude trend-stationarity at the 1% level. For
each of the remaining diﬀerenced variables, at least 3 out of the 5 tests indicate trend-stationarity at the 1%
level.
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Austria, France, Japan, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. Only a handful of countries did
not exhibit a decline after the 1980’s, as displayed in Figure 11. The variation in the experi-
ences of countries no doubt reflects, in part, diﬀerences in institutions, laws, and regulations.
Nevertheless, the decline in unionization is a common theme across these countries, and it
seems to have escalated in the 1980s, as computers and information technology started to
diﬀuse more rapidly. While data on private-sector unionization rates is not available for this
large cross section of countries, it is likely that private-sector unionization fell even faster,
the decline possibly starting even earlier than the 1980s for many countries.
Did skill-biased technological change play a role in the decline of unionization in other
countries as well? If this is the case, unionization rates in other countries should also be
positively associated with the relative price of new capital goods, which also exhibited decline
over the past three decades in many countries. Table 8 provides the results of regressions
based on (11), with countries replacing industries as the cross-sectional unit of observation.
The relative price of new capital used in this regression is the real price of information and
communication technologies (ICT) and transport and other machinery equipment divided
by the real price of consumption. This series can be calculated only for certain countries and
years due to data availability, resulting in a smaller sample than the entire set of countries
for which union membership information is available. The share of imports and exports
in GDP, labor productivity, the share of manufacturing in GDP, the share of public-sector
employment, and the share of young people in the population are included as controls.26 In
the 2SLS regressions, the lagged value of the relative price is used as an instrument for the
relative price. The results indicate a positive association between union membership and
the relative price of capital, as in Table 6 and 7. While these country-level results are not
as refined as in the case of U.S. due to lack of detailed data, they appear to support the
findings in the previous section for the case of U.S.
26 See the Appendix for data sources and details on the variables used.
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8 Conclusion
A general equilibrium model of unionization is developed here. Firms hire capital, skilled
labor, and unskilled workers. They diﬀer in productivity. A union can organize unskilled
labor at a cost. It cares about the wage rate that its members earn, and how many workers
receive this wage. There is a trade oﬀ between these two objectives. The union sets its
membership and the wage so that it squeezes all of the rents from the last firm organized.
The higher is the union wage, the smaller is the number of unionized firms and the amount of
unskilled labor each hires. The union targets the most productive firms in the economy. This
prediction of the model is supported by recent research. Dinlersoz, Greenwood and Hyatt
(2013) examine all union certification elections in the U.S. between 1977 and 2007, matched
with micro data on business characteristics. They find that the likelihood of unionization
increases with a firm’s productivity, as proxied by both firm size and age.27
The structure of production influences the value of unskilled labor. When the productiv-
ity of unskilled labor is (relatively) high, it pays for the union to organize a lot of firms and
demand generous wages. The shift from an artisan economy to an assembly line economy
during the beginning of the 20th century was associated with an increase in the (relative)
productivity of unskilled labor that led to an increase in unionization and a decrease in
income inequality. The decline of the assembly line economy and the rise of the information
age reversed this trend, leading to the ∩-shaped pattern of unionization and the ∪-shaped
one for income inequality.
The empirical analysis proceeds on three fronts. First, qualitative evidence is presented
from a historical perspective. This evidence lays out the evolution of unionization and the
27 Specifically, suppose that a union learns, in a Bayesian fashion, a new establishment’s productivity
over time, and targets the establishment if it believes that it is profitable enough to unionize. Profitable
establishments are likely to be the ones that have grown fast. The odds of being targeted is then positively
associated with establishment size, given age, and negatively related with age, given size. This is born out in
the data. Unionized establishments also have higher labor productivity. They also show that the odds of an
establishment being targeted for a certification election have been declining since early 1980’s. Furthermore,
the exit rate for union establishments have also been greater than for non-union ones. This lead to a secular
decline in the number of union establishments. These facts are consistent with skill-biased technological
change.
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shifts in the mix of skilled and unskilled labor used in production in the wake of some funda-
mental changes in the U.S. economy during the 20th century. These changes were brought
about by the introduction of mass production techniques in the first half of the century and
by computerization in the second half. Second, the constructed model is calibrated and sim-
ulated to gauge whether or not it could explain the above stylized facts. It can. To obtain
the patterns in data, the amount of skill bias must follow a ∩-shaped pattern. The required
change in skill bias is not that large. It also mirrors the qualitative pattern expected from
economic history.
Third, some statistical analysis is undertaken to relate unionization to skill-biased tech-
nological change. Following the macroeconomics literature, the relative price of new equip-
ment and software is taken as a measure of skill-biased technological change. Technological
progress is embodied in the form of new capital goods and is reflected by a declining relative
price for investment. Industries where the price of the capital inputs decline faster should ex-
perience greater skill-biased technological change and deunionization. This hypothesis finds
support in several tests. First, the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor is found to be higher in
those industries with a lower relative price of capital. Second, this relative price is negatively
associated with unionization in an industry, and unionization declined faster in industries
where the relative price fell more. Finally, deunionization was widespread across developed
countries in recent decades, and additional analysis suggests that skill-biased technological
progress may also be a factor in explaining the trends for a number of OECD countries.
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Table 1: Workers in Detroit Metal Industries, 1891
Occupation No. Percent Mean Weekly Income
Foreman 9 2 $19.67
Mechanics 153 39 12.58
Specialists 117 30 8.18
Unskilled Labor 113 29 6.60
Total 392 100 9.55
Source: Meyer (1981, pg. 46)
Table 2: Workers in Ford Motor Company, 1913
Occupation No. Percent
Mechanics and Subforeman 329 2
Skilled Operators 3,431 26
Operators 6,749 51
Unskilled Workers 2,795 21
Total 13,304 100
Source: Meyer (1981, pg. 50)
Rank in
employment 
decline Occupation
% Growth in employment 
(1983-2002)
% Union members 
in 1983
1 Brickmason and stonemason apprentices -189.6 45.1
2 Shoe machine operators -163.3 30.3
3 Railroad brake, signal, and switch operators -159.6 94.8
4 Housekeepers and butlers -155.9 1.4
5 Drilling and boring machine operators -137.3 48.3
6 Helpers, mechanics, and repairers -135.4 15.4
7 Patternmakers, lay-out workers, and cutters -128.3 28.8
8 Patternmakers and model makers, wood -120.5 0.0
9 Lathe and turning machine operators -115.8 36.4
10 Typesetters and compositors -114.4 14.5
11 Shoe repairers -112.9 9.5
12 Solderers and brazers -106.5 23.9
13 Rail vehicle operators, n.e.c. -103.4 90.9
14 Milling and planing machine operators -102.9 40.4
15 Adjusters and calibrators -102.2 46.9
16 Lathe and turning machine set-up operators -99.3 58.8
17 Roasting and baking machine operators, food -97.6 72.5
18 Production samplers and weighers -95.1 28.6
19 Winding and twisting machine operators -94.8 11.3
20 Hand cutting and trimming occupations -93.6 27.4
Average: -121.4 36.3
Rank in
employment 
growth Occupation
% Growth in employment 
(1983-2002)
% Union members 
in 1983
1 Numerical control machine operators 179.4 36.9
2 166.9 10.8
3 164.2 0.0
4 159.8 8.7
5 158.7 0.0
6 156.4 32.2
7 147.7 100.0
8 144.3 7.4
9 140.4 16.6
10 135.4 0.5
11 128.8 6.2
12 125.7 3.4
13 124.2 55.0
14 121.2 13.4
15 121.0 69.7
16 120.5 13.9
17 116.4 10.9
18 115.6 16.1
19 112.4 10.9
20
Helpers, suveyor
Optometrists
Managers, medicine and health
Inspectors, agricultural products 
Health diagnosing practitioners, n.e.c. 
Marine Engineers
Computer systems analysts and scientists 
Graders and sorters, agricultural products 
Physical scientists, n.e.c.
Medical scientists
Management analysts
Teachers, special education
Postsecondary teachers, subject not specified 
Precision assemblers, metal 
Authors
Health technologists and technicians, n.e.c. 
Social scientists, n.e.c. 
Investigators and adjusters, except insurance 
Physical therapists 111.0 14.7
Average: 137.5 21.4
Notes: Gray shading indicates a unionization rate in the top quartile of the 1983 unionization rates across occupations. Growth rates
are calculated by using the average of the 1983 and 2002 employment levels as the denominator.
Fastest declining occupations
TABLE 3. Fastest declining and fastest growing occupations (1983-2002)
Fastest growing occupations
Table 4: Parameter values
Parameter Definition Basis
Tastes
 = (104)−5 discount factor standard
Technology
 = 060 labor’s share Greenwood et al. (2010)
 = 1− (1− 008)5 depreciation rate standard
 = 020 exponent on capital Guner et al. (2008, p 732)
 = 029 elasticity of substitution Katz and Murphy (1992, eq 19)
1955 = 053 weight on skilled labor skill premium, T(2)
1955 = 10 shift factor on skilled labor normalization
 = 2005 Pareto distribution firm-size distribution, T(4)
 = 007 fixed cost union wage premium, T(5)
Unionization
 = 065 ideals—wage union membership, T(1)
 = 005 organization costs, constant union dues, T(3)
1955
Specification: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
industry relative price of equipment and software -0.256*** -0.403*** -0.411*** -0.369*** -0.395*** -0.159** -0.191*** -0.205* -0.242***
[0.05] [0.09] [0.03] [0.07] [0.04] [0.07] [0.04] [0.10] [0.04]
industry relative wage of production workers - 1.660*** 1.860*** 1.669*** 1.935*** 1.383*** 1.575*** 1.623*** 1.873***
[0.37] [0.09] [0.39] [0.10] [0.25] [0.10] [0.37] [0.10]
real industry output - - - 0.004 0.034 -0.248** -0.210*** -0.035 -0.007
[0.08] [0.02] [0.11] [0.03] [0.09] [0.02]
real industry output per worker - - - 0.090 0.055 0.208* 0.183*** 0.092 0.067*
[0.08] [0.04] [0.10] [0.03] [0.09] [0.03]
real industry capital stock - - - - - 0.315*** 0.281*** - -
[0.09] [0.02]
real industry price of investment - - - - - - - -0.659 -0.590***
[0.41] [0.08]
Industry fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year dummies N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 798 798 779 798 779 798 779 798 779
R-sq 0.47 0.75 0.76 0.82 0.78
Notes: Constant is not reported. Standard errors clustered by industry are in brackets. (*), (**), and (***) indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively. The 
number of observations in the IV estimations is lower due to the lagged instruments.
Dependent variable:  Logarithm of skill ratio, s it
TABLE 5. Fixed-effects panel regression analysis of the relationship between the skill ratio and the relative price of equipment and software
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLSOLSIndependent variables:(in logs except for fixed effects) OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Specification: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
mem. cov. mem. cov. mem. mem. cov. cov. mem. mem. cov. cov. mem. cov. mem. mem. cov. cov.
OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS(mfg.)
2SLS 
(non-
mfg.)
2SLS 
(mfg.)
2SLS 
(non-
mfg.)
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS(mfg.)
2SLS 
(non-
mfg.)
2SLS 
(mfg.)
2SLS 
(non-
mfg.)
industry relative price of 
equipment and software 0.472*** 0.495*** 0.444*** 0.466*** 0.205** 0.252*** 0.209** 0.262*** 0.357*** 0.267*** 0.380*** 0.277*** 0.323*** 0.377*** 0.308*** 0.294 0.324*** 0.407***
[0.05] [0.05] [0.02] [0.02] [0.10] [0.08] [0.09] [0.07] [0.11] [0.10] [0.10] [0.09] [0.11] [0.09] [0.11] [0.20] [0.10] [0.14]
real industry output - - - - - - - - - - - - -0.303*** -0.259*** -0.203** 0.305 -0.163* -0.261**
[0.09] [0.08] [0.10] [0.50] [0.10] [0.11]
real industry output per worker - - - - - - - - - - - - 0.494*** 0.485*** -0.047 -0.896 -0.076 0.603***
[0.14] [0.12] [0.16] [0.79] [0.15] [0.17]
number of industry 
establishments per capita - - - - -0.040 -0.035 -0.020 -0.015 -0.497*** 0.008 -0.476*** 0.027 0.100 0.114* -0.251* -0.255 -0.255* 0.133
[0.09] [0.05] [0.08] [0.04] [0.11] [0.06] [0.10] [0.05] [0.08] [0.07] [0.14] [0.28] [0.13] [0.09]
% U.S. employment classified 
as part time - - - - 0.473* 0.409 0.316 0.249 0.088 0.490 0.094 0.236 0.234 0.154 -0.350 0.338 -0.225 0.354
[0.26] [0.27] [0.25] [0.23] [0.28] [0.39] [0.26] [0.33] [0.30] [0.27] [0.25] [0.53] [0.24] [0.42]
% U.S. population in south - - - - -0.275 0.793 -0.799 0.183 -1.019 1.203 -0.979 0.391 1.675** 0.960 -0.589 2.254* -0.681 0.736
[0.66] [0.71] [0.53] [0.61] [0.69] [0.91] [0.64] [0.77] [0.81] [0.73] [0.65] [1.26] [0.63] [1.00]
% share of imports in U.S. GDP - - - - -0.494** -0.112 -0.571*** -0.228 -0.575*** 0.055 -0.580*** -0.146 -0.097 -0.238 -0.184 -0.002 -0.252 -0.284
[0.19] [0.24] [0.18] [0.20] [0.22] [0.31] [0.21] [0.26] [0.27] [0.24] [0.21] [0.41] [0.20] [0.33]
% share of exports in U.S. 
GDP - - - - -0.159 -0.296* -0.078 -0.198 -0.164 -0.342* -0.147 -0.219 -0.562*** -0.445*** 0.011 -0.306 0.003 -0.472**
[0.13] [0.15] [0.10] [0.13] [0.13] [0.18] [0.12] [0.15] [0.18] [0.16] [0.12] [0.28] [0.11] [0.20]
% U.S. population classified as 
young - - - - -1.082 0.765 -1.650** -0.102 -1.172 1.783 -1.066 0.367 0.754 -0.245 0.293 -0.407 0.042 -0.392
[0.73] [1.12] [0.77] [0.96] [1.16] [1.61] [1.08] [1.36] [1.25] [1.13] [1.04] [2.25] [1.00] [1.74]
% U.S. population in south 
* manufacturing dummy - - - - -1.293* -1.477* -1.032 -1.223* - - - - -3.331*** -2.887*** - - - -
[0.74] [0.84] [0.65] [0.72] [0.92] [0.83]
% share of imports in U.S. GDP 
* manufacturing dummy - - - - -0.141 -0.227 -0.187 -0.276 - - - - -0.085 -0.109 - - - -
[0.18] [0.27] [0.17] [0.23] [0.29] [0.26]
% share of exports in U.S. GDP 
* manufacturing dummy - - - - 0.027 0.088 -0.009 0.053 - - - - 0.453* 0.356 - - - -
[0.17] [0.24] [0.14] [0.21] [0.26] [0.24]
Industry fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 1003 1003 1003 1003 1003 944 1003 944 336 608 336 608 656 656 256 400 256 400
R-sq 0.17 0.16 0.33 0.42 0.38 0.47
Notes: Constant is not reported. Standard errors clustered by industry are in brackets. (*), (**), and (***) indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1%, respectively. The number of observations in the IV estimations is lower due to the lagged instruments. The number of 
observations in specifications 13 to 18 is lower because not all industry codes in the data for the relative price of E&S could be matched to industry codes in the data for output. Industries exclude public sector and agriculture. 
Independent variables:
(in logs, except dummies)
Dependent variable:  Logarithm of percent union membership (mem. ) or coverage (cov. )
TABLE 6. Fixed-effects panel regression analysis of the relationship between unionization and the relative price of equipment and software
Specification: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
mem. mem. mem. mem. cov. cov. cov. cov. mem. mem. cov. cov.
OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
industry relative price of 
equipment and software 0.555*** 0.590*** 0.374 0.408* 0.626*** 0.662*** 0.584*** 0.620*** 0.793** 0.747** 0.921** 0.882**
[0.22] [0.22] [0.24] [0.24] [0.18] [0.18] [0.20] [0.20] [0.33] [0.33] [0.43] [0.43]
real industry output - - - - - - - - 1.282* 1.205 1.229* 1.161*
[0.75] [0.76] [0.65] [0.65]
real industry output per worker - - - - - - - - -1.532*** -1.523*** -1.565*** -1.562***
[0.41] [0.41] [0.35] [0.36]
number of industry 
establishments per capita -0.419*** -0.430*** -0.429*** -0.440*** -0.235** -0.247** -0.233** -0.245** -0.598*** -0.593*** -0.444** -0.443**
[0.13] [0.13] [0.13] [0.13] [0.11] [0.11] [0.11] [0.11] [0.21] [0.22] [0.19] [0.19]
% U.S. employment classified 
as part time 0.723** 0.709** 0.624* 0.613* 0.704** 0.690** 0.606** 0.595** 0.091 0.086 0.221 0.214
[0.34] [0.34] [0.36] [0.36] [0.29] [0.29] [0.30] [0.30] [0.46] [0.46] [0.40] [0.40]
% U.S. population in south 1.478* 2.709*** 1.462* 2.682*** 1.329** 2.339*** 1.469** 2.479*** 2.274** 3.054** 2.106** 2.703**
[0.79] [0.91] [0.82] [0.95] [0.66] [0.76] [0.69] [0.79] [1.10] [1.24] [0.95] [1.07]
% share of imports in U.S. GDP -0.231 -0.233 0.147 0.311 -0.132 -0.079 0.142 0.337 -0.041 0.186 -0.122 0.079
[0.22] [0.26] [0.29] [0.34] [0.18] [0.22] [0.24] [0.29] [0.37] [0.45] [0.32] [0.39]
% share of exports in U.S. GDP -0.229 -0.245 -0.301* -0.377* -0.189 -0.185 -0.238* -0.283 -0.286 -0.308 -0.176 -0.143
[0.16] [0.20] [0.17] [0.21] [0.14] [0.17] [0.14] [0.17] [0.26] [0.29] [0.22] [0.25]
% U.S. population classified as 
young -1.294 -1.423 1.150 1.000 -1.571 -1.702 -0.246 -0.404 -1.283 -1.309 -2.705 -2.752
[1.70] [1.70] [2.04] [2.04] [1.42] [1.42] [1.71] [1.71] [2.68] [2.69] [2.31] [2.32]
% U.S. population in south 
* manufacturing dummy - -3.244** - -3.237** - -2.620** - -2.638** - -2.008 - -1.519
[1.27] [1.29] [1.06] [1.08] [1.83] [1.58]
% share of imports in U.S. 
GDP * manufacturing dummy - 0.037 - -0.450 - -0.118 - -0.537 - -0.555 - -0.493
[0.40] [0.53] [0.34] [0.45] [0.68] [0.59]
% share of exports in U.S. 
GDP * manufacturing dummy - 0.041 - 0.212 - -0.013 - 0.124 - 0.087 - -0.057
[0.33] [0.35] [0.27] [0.29] [0.46] [0.40]
N 944 944 885 885 944 944 885 885 615 615 615 615
R-sq 0.28 0.31 0.32 0.35
Notes: Constant is not reported. Standard errors clustered by industry are in brackets. (*), (**), and (***) indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1%, respectively. The number of observations in the IV estimations is 
lower due to the lagged instruments. The number of observations in OLS estimations is lower than the total in the original sample because not all industries had matching output data. 
Independent variables:
First-difference of the logarithm of
TABLE 7. First-difference panel regression analysis of the relationship between unionization and the relative price of equipment and software
Dependent variable:  First-difference of the logarithm of percent union membership (mem. ) or coverage (cov. )
Specification: 1 2 3 4 5
OLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
relative price of capital 0.384*** 0.280* 0.666*** 0.108** 0.054**
(0.05) (0.14) (0.15) (0.04) (0.02)
% share of imports in GDP - 0.174 0.108 0.072** 0.067*
(0.11) (0.08) (0.04) (0.04)
% share of exports in GDP - -0.042 -0.137* -0.035 -0.029
(0.17) (0.07) (0.03) (0.03)
labor productivity - -0.402* -0.392*** -0.298** -0.298**
(0.21) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12)
% share of manufacturing in GDP - 0.455*** 0.279** 0.067 0.012
(0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
public sector employment - 0.423 0.588*** 0.593* 0.635*
(0.34) (0.16) (0.31) (0.34)
% of population classified as young - 0.774 0.605** 0.504*** 0.434***
(0.71) (0.27) (0.14) (0.15)
N 311 311 242 242 173
R-sq 0.65 0.65 0.44
Notes: Constant is not reported. Standard errors clustered by country are in brackets. (*), (**), and (***) indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1%, 
respectively. The number of observations in the IV estimations is lower due to the lagged instruments. 
Independent variables:
(in logs)
Dependent variable:  Logarithm of percent union membership
First-differenceCountry Fixed-Effects
TABLE 8. Fixed-effects and first-difference panel regression analysis of the relationship between unionization and the relative price 
of capital -- selected OECD countries
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Figure 1. Income inequality and private-sector union membership in the U.S. during the 20th century
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Figure 2: Ratio of unskilled to skilled workers, 1860 to 1990
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Notes: The solid curve is the nonparametric fit with its 95% confidence intervals shaded gray. The dashed line is the linear fit. Local third−degree polynomial smoothing with an Epanechnikov kernel and a bandwidth
of 40 is used to generate the nonparametric estimate.
Figure 3. The relationship between occupation employment growth and unionization
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Notes: The solid curve is the nonparametric fit, with its 95% confidence intervals shaded gray. The dashed line is the linear fit. Local third−degree polynomial smoothing with an Epanechnikov kernel and a bandwidth
of 40 is used to generate the nonparametric estimate.
Figure 4. The relationship between industry employment growth and unionization
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Figure 5: Skill-biased technological change: unskilled labor becomes more favored when 
the isoquant shifts from  to , say due to the introduction of assembly line
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Figure 6: Skill-biased and neutral technological change, model
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Figure 7: Union membership over the 20th century, data and model
1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
0.30
0.32
0.34
0.36
0.38
0.40
0.42
0.44
0.46
Fr
ac
tio
n,
 T
op
 1
0%
Year
Data
Model
Data, HP trend
Figure 8: The distribution of income over the 20th century, data and model
Figure 9: The welfare loss from unions
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Notes: The vertical lines indicate 1980. The solid curves are the trends from the HP−filtered series. Slovenia also exhibited decline in union membership, but it was dropped because it had only four data points. 
Source: OECD StatExtracts
Figure 10. Union membership in OECD countries − cases of decline after 1980
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Notes: The vertical lines indicate 1980. The solid curves are the trends from the HP−filtered series. 
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Figure 11. Union membership in OECD countries − cases of no decline after 1980
9 Appendix
9.1 Data Sources
9.1.1 Figure 1
The private-sector union membership rates (excluding agriculture) for the period 1973-2012
come directly from the Union Membership and Coverage Database (www.unionstats.com),
with 1982 imputed using the average of the adjacent years. For the period 1910-1972, several
versions of the U.S. Census Bureau’s Statistical Abstract of the United States are used to
calculate membership rates. Employment in the private sector (excluding agriculture) is
used for the denominator of the union membership rate for all years 1910-1972. For the
numerator, the number of union members excluding those in public sector (federal, state,
and local governments) is used. The number of total union members is available for all years
1910 to 1972. The numerator can be calculated from the available data items in the Abstract
for the years 1910 to 1934. For the period 1935 to 1972, the number of public-sector union
members is available for 1940, 1950, 1955, 1960, 1964-1966, 1968, and 1970. For these nine
years, the share,  of public-sector union members in total union members is as follows: 10%
(1940), 13% (1950), 10% (1955), 12% (1960), 8% (1964), 9% (1965), 9% (1965), 11% (1968),
and 13% (1970). For the rest of the years between 1940 to 1972 for which  is unavailable,
a linear interpolation is used to impute a value, b. Private-sector union membership is then
backed out as 1− b times the total number of union members for each year for which  is
unobserved. Alternative methods, such as using the grand average of  over the nine years
for which it is available to impute the missing values, yield very similar time paths for the
period 1935 to 1972. Note also that for the calibration of the model, the unionization rates
for 1910, 1955 and 2000 are used, and these rates are not imputed.
The underlying data for the income distribution comes from Historical Statistics of the
United States: Millennial Edition. The data is series Be29. It refers to the distribution
of income among taxpaying units, specifically the share of income received by the 10th
percentile. Income is net of corporate taxes and employer-paid payroll taxes, but is before
individual income taxes and individual-paid payroll taxes; it excludes capital gains. The
series is based on work by Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez.
9.1.2 Figure 2
The underlying data series come from the Historical Statistics of the United States: Mil-
lennial Edition. The unskilled labor force is taken to be the sum of clerical workers (Series
Ba1038), sales workers (Ba1039), operatives (Ba1041) and laborers (Ba1045). The skilled
workforce is professionals (Ba1034) plus managers and oﬃcials (Ba1037) added together
with craft workers (Ba1040). In the figure the ratio of these two series is plotted.
9.1.3 Establishment-Size Distribution
The descriptive statistics for the employee size of U.S. establishments come from the Lon-
gitudinal Business Database (LBD) of the U.S. Census Bureau. The LBD contains annual
information on employment for all U.S. establishments. For each year in the period 1976
to 2011, the mean, standard deviation, and the coeﬃcient of variation of the establishment
employment are calculated across all establishments in the employer universe with at least
one employee. The averages of the mean, standard deviation, and the coeﬃcient of variation
of employment over this period are approximately 17, 113, and 7, respectively. The average
value (of about 7) for the coeﬃcient of variation is used in guiding the simulation analysis.
The coeﬃcient of variation stayed in a narrow band with a slight decline during this period,
as is shown in Figure 12. The coeﬃcient of variation is slightly higher if establishments
reporting zero employees are also included in the size distribution.
9.1.4 Union Membership and Coverage by Industry and Occupation in U.S.
The main data source for facts about unionization is the Union Membership and Coverage
Database (available at www.unionstats.com), described in Hirsch and Macpherson (2003).
This dataset contains two main variables that measure unionization: the union membership
rate and the union coverage rate. These rates were constructed by occupation and industry
using the union membership questions asked to individuals sampled in the Current Popula-
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Figure 12: The coeﬃcient of variation of establishment employment — U.S., 1976 to 2011
tion Survey (CPS). Their responses were aggregated by using the appropriate sample weights
in the survey to estimate unionization at the industry and occupation levels. In the data a
union member is defined to be a wage or salaried worker who answered that s/he belonged
to a union. Persons covered by a union are defined to be union members and non-members
who reported being covered by a collective bargaining agreement. Total employment in an
industry or occupation is also available from the same data source. In the analysis here,
the public sector is excluded from industries, but occupations include workers in the public
sector. The focus on the 1983-2002 period in the analysis is primarily due to the fact that
the detailed industry and occupation codes in the CPS before 1983 and after 2002 cannot be
made consistent with those during this period. The union membership and coverage data
by occupation and industry are used to generate Table 3, Figures 4-5, and Table 5.
9.1.5 Other Variables for U.S.
In Table 5, all variables other than  are from the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry
Database available at www.nber.org/nberces/. In Tables 6 and 7, the annual real output data
at the industry level is taken from the BEA: www.bea.gov/industry/gdpbyind_data.htm.
The percentage of the U.S. population in the south and west, part-time employment’s share
in total employment, the shares of imports and exports in U.S. GDP, and young people’s
share of the U.S. population all come from the U.S. Census Bureau. The annual number of
establishments in an industry is obtained from County Business Patterns, versions 1983 to
1999, maintained by the U.S. Census Bureau: www.census.gov/econ/cbp/index.html.
9.1.6 Data for Other Countries
The union membership rates in Figures 10 and 11 come from the OECD StatExtracts
(stats.oecd.org). The country-level data items used in the regressions in Table 8 are from the
OECD StatExtracts and the EU-KLEMS Database (www.euklems.net). The price of capital
used in the regressions reported in Table 8 is the average real price of ICT assets (com-
puting, communications, software equipment) and transport and other machinery equip-
ment, obtained from the EU-KLEMS Database—the series labelled Ip_IT, Ip_CT, Ip_Soft,
Ip_TraEq, and Ip_OMach. The capital price series are available only for certain countries
and years: Australia (1970-2007), Austria (1976-2007), Canada (1970-2004), Denmark (1970-
2007), Spain (1970-2007), Germany (1991-2007), Italy (1970-2007), Japan (1970-2006), the
Netherlands (1970-2007), Sweden (1993-1007), the United Kingdom (1970-2007), and the
United States (1977-2007). The price of consumption is also obtained from the EU-KLEMS
Database (series GO_P). The rest of the variables used in Table 8 come from the OECD
StatExtracts. The shares of exports, imports and manufacturing are calculated with respect
to GDP. Labor productivity is real GDP divided by employment. Public-sector employment
is the sum of employment in public sector, plus education and health sectors. The young
population is the share of people aged 18-45 in the population.
9.2 Theory
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose not, and that an interior solution for unionization occurs.
Then, the two first-order conditions associated with the above problem will be
[ − 
2
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Z ∞
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[Recall that  () =  ( ; ·).] Take the second first-order condition and multiply it byR∞
 [ ()] () to obtain
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Using this in the first first-order condition then gives
[ − 
2
− ]−11− = 0
The last condition can only be true if
 − 
2
−  = 0
This cannot transpire, hence a contradiction.
